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Abstract:  
This paper traces the boundaries of consent in the relations of recruited 
intelligence agents and their handlers. The U.S. Supreme Court considered these 
relations to be contractual. However, such a contract, according to the Supreme 
Court, is unenforceable. An Agent’s autonomy largely underpins the argument 
for the prima facie legitimacy of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) relations with 
each agent. Autonomy is also an essential element in recognizing the formulation 
of a recruitment contract. Sketching its boundaries in the human intelligence 
context (namely between the spy recruited typically within enemy ranks and the 
recruiter) raises the paradoxical question: How free is the free choice to give up 
freedom of choice? In contrast to the common deontological approaches, this 
paper offers an account of personal autonomy which incorporates the 
examination of dignity-compromising (dehumanizing) influences on the choice-
making process of the agent. If being autonomous is an exclusive human 
condition, then a condition in which a person is both dehumanized while making 
his choice, yet remains autonomous nonetheless, must be wrong. Hence, it is 
argued that any hierarchical model of personal autonomy should be interpreted 
as if incorporating a test of a dignity-compromising influence on the desires-
setting or choice-making process of a person. The case of voluntary intelligence 
agents, as in the case of consenting slaves, emphasizes a distinction between two 
points in time: Before and after making the choice to become an agent. This 
paper’s interpretation of autonomy suggests that even the most agreeable 
intelligence agent is not autonomous during the second phase due to the influence 
of the irreversibility problem. The very fact that the potential choice to reverse is 
being held by another person (the handler) is a humiliating influence on agent’s 
choice to proceed and therefore suggests the agent is non-autonomous. The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s classification of handling relations as contractual is, therefore, 
wrong. However, by denying the binding promissory power of the handling 
‘contract’, the Supreme Court is in fact right. Due to lack of autonomous will, 
these relations cannot formulate a contract to start with. 
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 INTRODUCTION I.
 
In its historical Totten case concerning claims of intelligence agents, 
the U.S. Supreme Court considered the relations of a recruited agent 
and his handler to be contractual in nature. However, such a contract, 
according to the Supreme Court, is unenforceable in court.1 Over a 
century later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its ruling in the Tenet 
case.2 It seems that the new rule even bans the very filing of any 
contractual claim of an intelligence agent against the intelligence 
agency. In addition to being anachronistic, the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning seems inconsistent. Its secrecy-based reasoning should have 
similarly applied to claims of contractors in ultra-secret projects or to 
claims of intelligence agencies’ employees. 3  This paper seeks a 
compelling explanation for this ruling: To start with, is a contract 
between a handler and an intelligence agent possible? Are intelligence 
agents sufficiently autonomous even when acting voluntarily?  
                                                
1 Totten v US 92 US (1875) 105. This case started as a ‘simple’ contractual claim 
against the federal US Government filed by the estate manager of a former 
intelligent agent. The agent, Lloyd, was recruited and handled by Lincoln himself. 
Apparently, the promises made by the government in return for the spying services 
were not kept. The US Supreme Court ruled that a contract between a handler and 
an intelligence agent is beyond judicial scrutiny. Court’s decision was very much 
based on the argument that judicial scrutiny of such contract is detrimental to 
state’s interests. In addition, the Court found such contracts to include an implied 
condition of mutual understanding of its unenforceable nature.   
2 Tenet v Doe 544 US (2005) 1; Goung v United States (1988) 860 F 2d 1063 (Fed Cir). In 
the case of Tenet, two former spies – a husband and a wife – claimed that the CIA 
was in breach of its commitment to pay them a life-long pension upon their 
defection. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the status of agent-handler 
contract to be beyond judicial scrutiny.  
3 Webster v Doe 486 US (1988) 592; United States v Reynolds 345 US (1953) 1.  
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I argue that on the one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court is right in 
determining the intelligence contracts to be unenforceable. On the 
other hand, I argue that the Supreme Court’s ruling is fundamentally 
wrong since the agent-handler relations cannot be contractual. By 
using a proposed dignity-based interpretation to the hierarchical 
model of personal autonomy, I argue, in a somewhat paradoxical 
manner, that such relations cannot form a contract. I show that the 
agents are typically being non-autonomous through the process, 
irrespective of the recruitment and handling being based on voluntary 
consent. 
   
The term ‘agent’ is frequently used to describe different agents in 
the realm of espionage and intelligence. This paper deals with 
recruited agents only. These are individuals who serve as human 
intelligence sources. They are recruited and handled by highly 
trained officers of an intelligence agency – the handlers. A handler 
is an employee and a citizen of the country she works for. The 
recruited agent, in contrast, is in many cases (but not always) a 
member of the forces or government of the adversary, such as an 
officer of the adversary army. Once recruited, such an agent will 
be covertly handled so he can routinely communicate information 
to his handler, perform for her tasks beyond enemy lines and get 
his instructions. 4  For example, a handler can be a Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) case-officer. She is an official of the 
American government, as an employee. She is expected to collect 
information from human sources, namely from agents she 
manages to recruit. An exemplary recruited agent can be, for 
instance, an Iranian Scientist who works for the Iranian defense 
industry. If recruited successfully, this scientist agent can 
communicate valuable secret information to the handler. 
Naturally, bringing a person to agree to work against his own 
people and community is a complicated task. The reasons for the 
agent’s consent vary; greed, revenge, ideology or pursuing 
excitement, are all good examples to the motivation of agent’s 
                                                
4 The handler-agent relations are unique. In most cases, if caught, the agent will 
face criminal charges of espionage and even death. He will be considered to be a 
traitor by his community. The recruitment task is therefore extremely challenging. 
The handler, initially and typically viewed by the designated agent as ‘the enemy’, is 
expected to convince the designated agent to assume the enormous risk and switch 
loyalties.  
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consent. This paper analyzes such agreement. I argue that such 
agreement can never be autonomously given even when made by 
the most willing agent.  
 
The question of the freedom of choice of the agent goes far beyond the 
doctrinal level of determining if a contract with the handlers has been 
formed. Although not a ‘justification’ in the regular sense, one of the 
very first arguments raised in supporting Human Intelligence 
(HUMINT) is the consent argument.5 It rests on the alleged agents’ 
informed and free consent to recruitment. The agent is described as an 
autonomous person voluntarily and knowingly accepting the offer to 
serve as a recruited agent. While consent does not justify the 
consensual act, it does carry the potential to remove objections to the 
act grounded in potential damages to the agent. Since we assume X 
weighs her interests best, it makes no sense to raise objections to X’s 
autonomous act, arguing for negative consequences to X. Painting the 
relations with the agent in contractual colors therefore has a moral and 
legal objective. It intends to relax concerns of potential observers. They 
should gather from such contractual relations that both parties have 
freely calculated the mutual balance of risks and benefits and that such 
balance has been independently judged to be beneficial to each of the 
involved.  
 
It is believed that most recruited agents are indeed being recruited and 
operated voluntarily. Normally, no apparent means of coercion is 
involved.6 Are these agents therefore deemed autonomous agents? As 
mentioned, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the contractual approach 
                                                
5 H Klehr, ‘Reflections on Espionage’ (2004) 21 Social Philosophy and Policy 141, 156-
158. HUMINT is a code word in the world of espionage for HUMan INTelligence, 
namely intelligence gathered from human sources. It should be noted that HUMINT 
is a far broader activity than handling agents. It includes all information collection 
that is based on interaction with humans, such as handling agents, interrogating 
people, questioning people, meetings or even getting informative anonymous phone 
calls. This paper, as mentioned, deals solely with one type of HUMINT: running 
(handling) recruited intelligence agents. For the various sources of intelligence and 
the theory of their use, see: M Herman, Intelligence Powers in Peace and War 
(Cambridge UP 1996). 
6 See S Wood, ‘Americans Who Spied Against Their Country Since World War 2’ 
(1992) Defense Personnel Security Research Center. These findings match similar 
empirical research: MF Wiskoff and CC Fitz, ‘The Defense Investigative Service’s 
Issue Case Data Base: Analysis of Issue Types and Clearance Adjudication’ (1991) US 
Department of Defense, Defense Investigative Service, Monterey, CA. 
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to HUMINT based on the consent of the agents and hence on the view 
that these agents are autonomous.7 The essence of this paper is to 
rethink this contractual presumption.8 It questions the very possibility 
of an autonomous agent, regardless if voluntary. It is mainly centered 
on the paradox of respecting people’s free choice to step into freedom-
limiting situations. In other words, certain types of intelligence agents 
force us to answer the paradoxical question: How free is the free choice 
to give up freedom of choice?  
 
In the course of re-contextualizing intelligence agents’ contractual 
freedom, it is necessary to review the philosophical models of personal 
autonomy. I begin with presenting the basic hierarchical model of 
autonomy and its modern enhancements. I then suggest a new 
approach and interpretation to these models of autonomy, centered on 
a dignity-based test of potential influences over the preferences and 
desires setting and identification process of a person. As opposed to a 
mainstream deontological approach, I argue against viewing dignity as 
a derivative of autonomy.9 I also argue against Dan-Cohen’s view of 
                                                
7 In its Totten case, the Supreme Court even anchored the secrecy-based reasoning 
to the ‘contract’ itself. The Court assumed that this contract included an unwritten 
understanding that both parties’ lips must remain sealed. Totten v US (n 1) at 107.  
8 One methodological comment is required concerning philosophical autonomy and 
legal autonomy. One could possibly argue that the US Supreme Court is not 
necessarily wrong but rather merely applying a ‘legal’ concept of autonomy, 
supposedly different in content from the philosophical meaning of personal 
autonomy. I disagree. While a legal argument calling for limiting autonomy in 
certain cases may be reasonable, I believe a legal argument cannot be reasonable if 
calling instead for limiting the notion of autonomy itself. While I am aware of the 
existence of opinions to the contrary and even to legal fictions, this paper is written 
as a philosophical analysis of law. It views law from the philosophical perspective 
and it addresses autonomy accordingly. If law needs to have a different concept of 
autonomy or even if Court could answer the current argument with a ‘legal 
argument’ is far beyond the scope of this paper. 
9 See, for instance, Hill’s description of mainstream deontological approaches 
viewing dignity as a derivative of autonomy in the Kantian sense: ‘Immanuel 
Kant held that autonomy is the foundation of human dignity and the source of 
all morality; and contemporary philosophers dissatisfied with utilitarianism are 
developing a variety of new theories that, they often say, are inspired by Kant’. 
TE Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge UP 1991), 43. See similar opinions 
on autonomy being the ground – according to Kant – for dignity at:  TE Hill, 
Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Cornell UP 1992), 38-41; C 
Korsgaard, ‘Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals’ (2004) 
25 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 26, 81-83; CM Korsgaard, Creating the 
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dignity and autonomy as independent notions. While common 
deontological approaches find us to be respect-worthy as a result of 
our capacity for autonomy, I believe our autonomous capacity is 
conditional upon our being respected.  
 
My conclusions suggest that voluntary intelligence agents are non-
autonomous agents and therefore their consent could not serve as a 
counter-argument against objections to their recruitment. This is 
mainly related to dignity undermining influences on either their 
decision to be recruited (such as the easy case of manipulation) or on 
their decision to continue operations (like the irreversibility of the 
relations).  
 
If my new interpretation of agents’ autonomy is correct, then a 
contractual approach to HUMINT relations might be majorly 
weakened. Under an autonomy-based approach to contracts, there 
cannot be a valid basis to the contractual approach if indeed 
recruitment or further operation of an agent is not a reflection of free 
will (even if no means of coercion is applied). 10  This stands in 
contradiction to the U.S. Supreme Court’s understanding of handling 
relations as contractual, as reflected by the Totten and Tenet cases.11  
 
In section II, I present various types of intelligence agents who 
voluntarily accept their recruitment and handling. These exemplary 
relations reflect a spectrum of the autonomous will of such agents. In 
section III, I briefly present the basic moral meaning of consent.  
Section IV outlines the basic meaning of the notion of personal 
autonomy. It presents the inherent difficulty in determining if 
                                                                                                                                        
Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge UP 1996); AW Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought 
(Cambridge UP 1999). 
10 T Gutmann, ‘Some Preliminary Remarks On a Liberal Theory of Contract’ (2013) 
76(2) Law & Contemporary Problems; C Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of 
Contractual Obligation (Harvard UP 1981); TM Scanlon, ‘Promises and Contracts’  in 
P Benson (ed), The Theory of Contract Law: New Essays (Cambridge UP 2001) 86, 
92; RE Barnett, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’ [1986] Colum L Rev 269; A Ripstein, 
‘Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls’ (2006) 92(7) Virginia Law Review 
1391; R Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence: “Impaired Consent” or “Wicked Exploitation”?’ 
(1996) 16 Oxford J of Legal Studies 503.  
11 Totten v US (n 1) ; Tenet v Doe (n 2). In Totten, the US Supreme Court went as far as 
concluding that the President of the United States and hence the entire executive 
branch, bears the authority to engage on behalf of the US with contracts with 
human sources. 
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voluntary intelligence agents are indeed autonomous. The basic idea of 
autonomy seems to fail to tell us what makes a difference between, for 
example, a voluntary intelligence agent and a voluntary elite soldier. 
For instance, a volunteer to the French Foreign Legion, an elite 
military unit, agrees to be subjected to the will of her commanders. 
That is the essence of being commanded as a soldier. What makes her 
more autonomous than the Iranian scientist who agrees to accept the 
will of his handler as a recruited agent? 12 In section IV, I suggest 
Frankfurt’s hierarchical model of personal autonomy as the source for 
an answer. In section V, I suggest a dignity-based interpretation of the 
hierarchical model. This interpretation, as is argued, shows why in 
contradiction to Dan-Cohen’s argument there cannot be autonomous 
slaves. Accordingly, I show why there cannot be autonomous 
intelligence agents. I conclude by illuminating the conclusions that 
follow from the proposed dignity-based interpretation.  
 
In a way, the entire debate over the autonomy of intelligence agents is 
no more than a good excuse for promoting the understanding of other 
servile relations characterized by self-imposed limitations on the scope 
of freedom, such as prostitution and sale of organs. I argue that the 
proposed interpretation of the hierarchical model of autonomy can 
enhance our understanding of these common types of relations. 
 
 THE CONSENTING INTELLIGENCE AGENTS II.
 
Discussing the theory of personal autonomy may lead to abstract 
notions. However, the dilemmas of the HUMINT world are far from 
being abstract and are chillingly real. I therefore use a few illustrative 
practical examples throughout this paper, all of which are of recruited 
agents consenting to their recruitment approaches or to being further 
handled.  
 
I begin with two illustrative agents. Both are anonymous. One is 
evidently real, although his identifying details are unknown. Let us call 
                                                
12  Elite units are military units of Special Forces. They are assigned the more 
complicated and dangerous military tasks. Their soldiers are typically volunteers. In 
volunteering, they assume both the entailed risks and the total subjection to their 
commanders. They work for their country. In contradistinction, the recruited agent 
typically works for an intelligence agency of an adversary nation against his own 
country. But apparently, both the volunteer soldier and the volunteer agent make a 
similarly free decision to assume risks and give-up freedom.  
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him X. X is a recruited double agent operated by the CIA inside the 
Soviet Union. In one of his meetings with his case officers, he is 
anxious and nervous. He has a real reason to believe the KGB is 
suspecting him. Apparently, he is expected to go through a debriefing 
and even a polygraph check by the KGB handlers upon his return. He 
asks for cessation of his activity as an agent. His case officers are not 
willing to lose his valuable services yet. They convince him he can 
easily learn how to outsmart a polygraph. They take him through a fake 
polygraph check and show him fake successful results. The agent 
relaxes and agrees to further operate as an agent and travel back to the 
Soviet Union.13 A more trivial example while discussing autonomy is 
the false flag recruitment. In such a case, the agent is recruited and 
misled to believe he is assisting a friendly state, while actually being 
operated by the enemy.14 
 
Alternatively, one can think of agents who have more understanding of 
the intelligence game or agents who express a clear desire to be 
operated. First is Aldrich Ames, a senior American CIA officer 
stepping into a Soviet embassy and offering his information services 
for money. His operation resulted in considerable damage to American 
intelligence, including the arrest and execution of a few American 
recruited agents. Numerous intelligence operations were frustrated.15 
                                                
13 DL Perry, ‘Repugnant Philosophy – Ethics, Espionage and Covert Action’ in J 
Goldman (ed), Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence Professional (Scarecrow 
Press 2006), 225-226.  
14 As an example for this technique, let us imagine an agent who is an Iranian 
General whom the CIA wish to recruit. The American case officers have reason to 
believe the General is antagonistic toward America and likely to refuse. Knowing his 
sympathy towards France, they approach him pretending to be officers of the 
French Secret Service. He agrees and eventually is recruited and is handled for 
years. His operation is fully based on consent. In fact, the general even likes being 
an agent and the only abnormality with his activity is the fact that he mistakenly 
believes to be working for the French Service. 
15 US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ‘An Assessment of the Aldrich H 
Ames Espionage Case and its Implications for US Intelligence’, Report of the 103rd 
Congress, 2nd Session (1 November 1994) 
<www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs103rd/10390.pdf> accessed 8 July 2014; D Wise, 
Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for $4.6 Million (HarperCollins 
Publishers 1995); P Earley, ‘Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Ames’ 
(GP Putnam's Sons 1997); T Weiner, D Johnston and NA Lewis, Betrayal. The Story 
of Aldrich Ames, an American Spy (Rockland MA, Wheeler Public 1996); V 
Cherkashin and G Feifer, Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer; The true story of the 
man who recruited Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames (Basic Books 2005); BB Fischer, 
2014]  Intelligence Agents and the U.S. Supreme Court 12 
Ames initiated his own recruitment. As a senior intelligence 
professional, he was fully aware of the rules of the intelligence game 
and its risks.  
 
Avishay Raviv is another agent, recruited by the Israeli General 
Security Agency (‘GSA’) and operated within circles of right wing 
extremists during the early 90’s. Raviv had been identified as suffering 
from personality and behavioral issues, including an obsessive 
ascription of importance to the relations with his handlers.16  
 
In order to further complicate the example, let us imagine a new agent, 
with extreme servile aspects of Raviv’s personality. Let us call him the 
monk-agent. Just like the monks of St. Ignatious of Loyola described 
by Taylor, he is willingly subjecting his will to the will of his handlers17. 
According to the Ignatian rules, monks are required to fully 
subordinate their wills to the will of their abbots. Personal discretion is 
believed by this order to be exposing the monks to the temptations of 
Satan. Another good analogy is the servile woman presented first by 
Thomas Hill. 18  She takes pleasure and fully consents to devoting 
herself to taking care of her husband’s needs and promoting his 
interests. This type of subjection in the cases of the servile woman, the 
monk and the monk-agent, is absolute. They all willingly accept the 
will of another person, whether a husband, an abbot or a handler, to 
be their own.19  
 
Acceptance of the handler’s will is held to be superior to the monk-
agent’s, as if it were a self-imposed imperative. The agent is guided by 
                                                                                                                                        
‘Spy Dust and Ghost Surveillance: How the KGB Spooked the CIA and Hid Aldrich 
Ames in Plain Sight’ (2011) 24 Intl J of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 268. 
16 Criminal Case 2070/99 State of Israel v Avishai Raviv,  Jerusalem Magistrate Court, 
unpublished 
17 I use this example mainly because it is also specifically relevant to the HUMINT 
context of the discussion on autonomy. On the monks of Saint Ignatious of Loyola 
as described by Taylor, see: JS Taylor, Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal 
Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy (Cambridge UP 2005), 1-29.  
18 TE Hill Jr, ‘Servility and Self-Respect’ in Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect (n 9).  
19 According to Hill, the servile person acts in violation of the duty to his own self. 
The argument presented in this paper is different in the sense that I argue against 
the view that his choice for servility is autonomous in the first place. Rather than 
arguing like Hill, that this choice is autonomous yet unacceptable (although Hill 
argues such choices are rarely autonomous), I argue that the choice for servility is 
never autonomous. 
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the belief that acting in accordance with the case officers’ will is 
practically the right route. This example is philosophically complex, 
since whenever the monk-agent implements his handlers’ will, he is in 
fact positive in his feeling of indirectly implementing his own will. The 
radical nature of the monk-agent example by no means indicates that 
this is a rare occurrence. While such an extreme instance of servility is 
probably rare, I believe a more moderate type of a servile agent is quite 
common.20   
 
All of these exemplary agents have agreed to their recruitment. None of 
them faced any apparent means of coercion in order to motivate this 
consent. But we can already easily identify the first two agents as non-
autonomous. Under any account of autonomy or consent, both false 
flag recruitment and the fake polygraph check are considered as 
critical external intervention with free will. As a result of the clear 
intervention, both agents adopted a will they mistakenly identified as 
their very own. Are Ames and the monk-agent autonomous persons 
distinctively making a free choice? This question places us in a 
junction allowing us two alternative routes, neither of which seems to 
offer an easy ride.  
 
Both types of agents are well informed and express clear consent to 
their recruitment. Accepting a concept of personal autonomy that 
determines the monk-agent to be non-autonomous seems almost an 
inherent logical error. After all, the monk-agent is aware of the 
handler’s level of control of his will, and yet, deems such control to be 
a genuine reflection of his very own will. On the other hand, 
considering the monk-agent to be autonomous intuitively seems just as 
wrong.  Our intuition rejects seeing servility as possibly co-existing 
with exercising free will.  
 
 
 
                                                
20 According to certain HUMINT professionals, a typical concept of running an 
agent requires absolute control of the agent’s will and mind (W Hood, Mole (WW 
Norton & Company 1982), 29; Perry, ‘Repugnant Philosophy’ (n 13). The concern of 
a certain level of servility as part of humint relations is fortified due to the fact that a 
substantial number of recruited agents are “walk-ins”, namely volunteers who 
initiate their recruitment. See Wood (n 6); Fitz and Wiskoff (n 6).  
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 THE AUTONOMY AND CONSENT CORE ARGUMENT III.
 
The importance of consent within legal and moral analysis of practical 
issues cannot be exaggerated. In many cases, signs of consent are the 
only differentiating element between severe harmful acts on the one 
hand and acceptable practices on the other. 21  It is consent that 
distinguishes between rape and normal sexual intercourse, between 
slavery and employment relations or between theft and donation. 
Accepting consensual acts does not mean labeling them as justified or 
right. 22  It does however reflect the exceptional authoritative power 
society refers to personal acts of consent and reflection of human will.23 
 
If we respect people’s autonomy and believe that an agent’s choice to 
accept a recruiting offer is an exercise of such autonomy, so the 
argument goes, we should respect the agent’s choice. We are expected 
to refrain from objecting to the recruitment as long as it is consensual 
and as long as the ground for arguing against operating the agent is 
relying on potential harm to the agent. Just as we do respect a young 
woman’s choice to volunteer for an elite military unit, irrespective of 
the related risks and potential damages, so we should respect an 
agent's consent to assume the risky and morally problematic task of a 
recruited intelligence agent.24  
                                                
21 P Young, The Law of Consent (North Ryde NSW, Law Book Co 1986). 
22 Hill, Autonomy and Self-respect (n 9), 49. 
23 See for example an attempt to offer a complete Kantian consent-based criminal 
theory: DAJ Richards, ‘Human Rights and the Moral Foundations of the 
Substantive Criminal Law’ (1978) 13 Georgia L Rev 1395. On another front, a wide-
range paternalistic legislation practically fixes new borders to personal autonomy on 
a daily basis. Most western states prefer to force us to fasten seat belts while driving 
rather than simply respect our personal choice not to do so. The deliberation 
process in setting such a rule is not focusing on the question: “Are the persons 
autonomous while fastening seat belts?” The debate is rather focusing on the 
question of what the counter arguments are for not respecting the driver’s choice on 
the matter. 
24 At this point, I conduct this analysis based on a general assumption that autonomy 
does have an important positive value irrespective of the tough debate over the 
nature of this value, whether of an intrinsic or of an instrumental value. I simply 
assume people’s choices should be respected and therefore not protested, for the 
very reason of being their own. By that, I do not mean to say that any act is justified, 
provided it is autonomous. Other considerations may obviously prevail. But so long 
as we don’t hold under the circumstances any prevailing counter considerations, 
autonomy should be respected. By that, the consent argument does not argue for 
human collection as justified, but rather as permissible. L Hawort, Autonomy: An 
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Cases of what seem to be clear autonomous acts, which still need to be 
rejected based on other prevailing considerations, seem to erode the 
moral status of personal autonomy. Scholars frequently ask us to 
balance personal autonomy against competing values. Dan-Cohen even 
further uses these examples in order to call for ascribing a lower level 
of importance to personal autonomy in comparison to other values, 
such as dignity. 25  It is the trivial cases of people accepting the 
unacceptable that mostly shake the foundations of the notion of 
autonomy as a morally validating concept. Take the case of Brown, 
where a husband was prosecuted and charged for beating his wife 
regardless of an alleged prior consent of the woman. Allegedly, the 
wife expressly asked her husband to beat her each time she got 
drunk.26 Dan-Cohen uses the case of Brown as a building block for a 
new normative scale. In this scale, dignity is superior to autonomy, 
while the two notions remain independent.27  
 
The link I wish to propose between autonomy and dignity suggests a 
different approach to the Brown case than Dan-Cohen’s. For now, I 
will only mention that according to my suggested approach, the wife is 
not autonomous to start with and therefore the case represents no 
contradiction between autonomy and dignity. Another important 
conclusion drawn from the case of Brown is that our moral attitude to 
personal choices is context-sensitive. While we may respect the choice 
of a woman to practice martial arts and to be consensually beaten as 
part of her training, we refuse to respect a similar choice of a woman in 
the family relations context. 28  Any suggested account of personal 
autonomy must, therefore, be sensitive to different contexts, such as 
the differences between sports and married life.29  
                                                                                                                                        
Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics (New Haven, Yale UP 1986); G Dworkin, 
‘Is More Choice Better than Less?’ (1982) 7 Midwest Studies In Philosophy 47, 55-56  
25 M Dan-Cohen, ‘Defending Dignity’ in M Dan-Cohen, Harmful Thoughts-Essays 
on Law, Self and Morality (Princeton and Oxford, Princeton UP 2002) 150, 154-157 . 
26  State v Brown 364 A 2d 27 (NJ Super Ct Law Div 1976), aff’, 381 A 2d 1231 (NJ Super Ct 
App Div 1977). 
27 Dan-Cohen (n 25), 154-157.  
28 One can view this point as a source of strength to the authoritative power of 
autonomy, since it illustrates consent’s flexibility and sensitivity to different 
contexts. 
29 A similar issue arises in contracts law in cases where the formation of the contract 
is ‘proper’ and yet we refuse to validate the deal based on its content. RE Barnett, ‘A 
Consent Theory of Contract’ (1986) 86 Columbia L Rev 269. 
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Accordingly, our interpretation of autonomy must eventually show 
special sensitivity to consent in the specific human collection context. 
However, the starting point for such analysis must be a preliminary 
review of the notion of autonomy in general.30 In order to determine if 
voluntary intelligence agents are indeed autonomous, a deeper 
understanding of the notion of personal autonomy is required. 
    
 AGENTS AND THE PARADOX OF RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY IV.
 
Autonomy is generally defined as a personal condition related to the 
psychological ability for self-government. 31  The link between the 
notion of autonomy and the notion of freedom is obvious. Being 
autonomous may also be involved with the right that such 
psychological condition is not interfered with.32 The basic concept of 
autonomy therefore means both a psychological condition of self-
government and a right-based concept of avoiding external 
interference with such condition. 33  
 
The typical handler-agent relations seem at first glance to be in 
contradiction to both meanings of autonomy. The substantial level of 
control and the potential mental manipulation derogate the 
psychological competence of self-government. And it seems to be 
externally interfering with the agent’s capability to produce the 
conditions for self-government:  
 
But the highest in the tradecraft is to develop a source that you ‘own 
lock, stock and barrel’. According to the clandestine ethos, a 
‘controlled’ source provides the most reliable intelligence. 
‘Controlled’ means, of course, bought or otherwise obligated. 
Traditionally it has been the aim of the professional in the clandestine 
                                                
30 J Christman, ‘Constructing the Inner Citadel: Recent Work on the Concept of 
Autonomy’ (1988) 99 Ethics 1, 109.  
31 J Feinberg, Harm to Self, Vol. III in The Moral Limits of Criminal Law (New York, 
Oxford UP 1986), 28. 
32 T Hill, ‘The Importance of Autonomy’ in EF Kittay and DT Meyers (eds), Women 
and Moral Theory (Rowman and Littlefield 1987) 129-138, at 133. 
33 Meyer for instance suggests a similar distinction between the two ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ meanings of autonomy. He prefers to define them as ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ meanings of autonomy. See: M Meyer, ‘Stoics, Rights, and Autonomy’ 
(1987) 24 American Philosophical Quarterly 3, 267. 
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service to weave a psychological web around any potentially fruitful 
contact and tighten that web whenever possible.34 
 
Achieving this goal requires a well-learnt technique of gradually 
draining signs of independence:  
 
The officer is painstakingly trained in techniques that will convert an 
acquaintance into a submissive tool, to shred away his resistance and 
deflate his sense of self-worth.35  
 
At this point, I cannot avoid re-citing Hood’s very clear description of 
the meaning intelligence organizations ascribe to the term ‘control’:  
 
No espionage service can tolerate the merest whiff of independence or 
reserve on the part of an agent… With a new agent, the case officer's 
first task is to maneuver him into a position where there is nothing 
that can be held back – not the slightest scrap of information nor the 
most intimate detail of his personal life. Until this level of control has 
been achieved, the spy cannot be said to have been fully recruited.36 
 
Obviously, this is an extreme description of the reality of HUMINT 
relations. If all handling relations had matched this description, moral 
analysis of HUMINT would have been trivial. And deep philosophical 
debates about personal autonomy would not be necessary. However, 
agents have their own cards to play. They source the information. 
Some of them, as in the case of Ames, are intelligence professionals. 
But even in the case of far more moderate handling, a substantial level 
of control is maintained. Accordingly, if intelligence agents seem to be 
non-autonomous under both meanings of autonomy – even in 
moderate cases of handling – then how can one accept (not object to) 
human intelligence collection on the ground of respecting the agent’s 
autonomy? Similarly, as opposed to the Supreme Court’s perception of 
handling relations, how can a non-autonomous agent be seriously 
viewed as a party to a contract? 
 
A counter argument points at other choices people make in life which 
also result in limiting personal freedom. And yet, we still expect such 
                                                
34 G Drexel Jr, ‘Ethics and Intelligence’, in J Goldman (ed) J Goldman (ed), Ethics of 
Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence Professional (Scarecrow Press 2006), 6. 
35 ibid 7. 
36 Hood (n 20), 29; Perry, ‘Repugnant Philosophy’, (n 13) at  230. 
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choices to be respected. The young woman electing to join an elite 
military unit is a good example of such a choice.37 It is safe to assume 
that her scope of freedom for self-government will be dramatically 
limited as a soldier compared to her civilian life. So, can there be 
choices, which we do find autonomous and therefore respect-worthy, 
irrespective of such choices resulting in limitation on the agent's scope 
of autonomy? 
 
I believe an answer may lie within further analysis of the nature of the 
psychological condition of autonomy. I argue that a valid source for a 
normative distinction between the young drafted woman and a 
common intelligence agent could be partially found in the separate 
models of personal autonomy of Frankfurt and Dworkin.38 I then offer 
a new perspective on the hierarchical model of autonomy, which in my 
view, may assist in answering the main questions of this paper: Is the 
consensual intelligence agent autonomous? What distinguishes 
between our respect to the autonomy of an elite soldier and the 
autonomy of an agent? Facing these questions, we are puzzled by the 
need to determine the scope of the freedom to give up freedom. This is 
where the hierarchical model of personal autonomy becomes relevant. 
 
 THE HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF PERSONAL AUTONOMY  V.
 
The hierarchical model of Frankfurt is based on the distinction 
between first level desires (or Lower-Order Desires, ‘LOD’) and 
second order desires (Higher-Order Desires, ‘HOD’). 39  The actual 
actions of a person are the objects of the Lower-Order Desires. For 
example, I want to walk and therefore walking is the object of my 
Lower-Order Desire. On the other hand, the objects of Higher-Order 
Desires are Lower-Order Desires and not actual actions. In such a 
case, an agent wants to desire. She controls the process of producing 
                                                
37 For the sake of clarity, I shall assume this is a unit of volunteers. All a candidate 
needs to do in order to quit is to announce her will to quit, as ringing the bell 
symbolizes in the film GI Jane.  
38 H Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’ (1971) 68 The J of 
Philosophy 5; G Dworkin, ‘The Concept of Autonomy’, in R Haller (ed), Science and 
Ethics (Amsterdam, Rodopi 1981), 203.  
39 Although both Frankfurt and Dworkin initiated hierarchical models, the concept 
of hierarchy of desires is mainly related to Frankfurt and most of the following 
debates are centered on Frankfurt’s model. Therefore when referring in this paper 
to the hierarchical model, I refer to Frankfurt’s model.  
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preferences. A person not only produces desires to desire; she can 
strongly identify with such desires. This is the basis for Dworkin’s ‘full 
formula of autonomy’. It considers a person to be autonomous if she 
identifies with her desires in a process that is completely internal.40  
  
This model assists us in making a rational distinction between the 
young woman draftee and the intelligence agent. The difference lies in 
the HOD and the identification process. Unlike the young draftee, we 
have strong grounds to doubt the authenticity of the HOD of the 
designated agent to desire to act as an intelligence agent. The false-flag 
recruitment of an agent is a perfect example of a discrepancy between 
LOD to work for the adversary and the HOD to desire to work for a 
friendly state. Such discrepancy is a result of deception, which 
disassociates our control of actions from our control of the will. Both 
choices, of the young draftee and the designated intelligence agent, 
will result in limitations on their LOD. However, based on the 
hierarchical model of Frankfurt, this in itself does not render them 
non-autonomous. It is the suspected influence over the HOD of the 
intelligence agent, which raises a doubt concerning his autonomous 
status. 
 
For now, the hierarchical model managed to explain why the agent 
recruited under obvious manipulation is not autonomous, though 
formally showing consent. His desire to will to be handled by State X 
does not match and identify with his first order desire to be handled by 
State Y. But the model does not filter out all instances of manipulation. 
If the handler is sophisticated enough, she will lead the agent into 
confirming the maneuvered desire as though initially preferred by the 
agent, and as though it were his very own. 
 
The hierarchical model manages to filter out desires, which do not 
match the actual HOD. But it faces difficulties when the manipulation 
‘takes over’ the very HOD. The hierarchical model is expected to 
duplicate its erroneous outcome with regard to the monk-agent. 
Apparently, the model will determine such agent as autonomous. This 
is a result of the monk-agent identifying with his desire to accept the 
will of his handler. He wants to will whatever the handler desires. In 
contrast, I assume most readers intuitively find this agent to be non-
autonomous. Something very wrong seems to be involved. But the 
                                                
40 Dworkin, (n 38), 212. 
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hierarchical model seems blind to it and incapable of filtering out such 
consensual relations. At this point, a deeper analysis of the model and 
its alleged failures is required.  
 
The hierarchical model is exposed to problems known as the problems 
of manipulation, authority and regression. Critics attack the 
requirement of identification of HODs and LODs.41 They point to the 
need to be autonomous in the first place for this very act of 
identification. We can easily imagine a person who is ‘freely’ matching 
her HODs to her LODs and yet she has done so as a result of some 
manipulation. But the problem of manipulation can also carry a 
broader form, setting endless circles of intervention around the agent’s 
biography. A deeper look at his life story might show powerful 
influences on this identification process by his education, 
socioeconomic status and many other background factors.42  
 
Another threat to the stability of the hierarchical model is its alleged 
exposure to regression. If autonomy requires identification between 
HODs and LODs, it may also require even Higher Order Desires in 
order for the agent to be the author of his HODs (HOD2) and these in 
turn will require an even higher level of desires in an endless form 
(HOD2 to HODn, while n could be infinitely increased). Apparently, 
autonomy cannot be determined, since it is dependent upon 
identification between an endless string of desires and higher desires.  
 
The mirror image of the regression problem is the authority 
failure. If the source of authority of the LOD is internal to the 
agent’s self (HOD), then the regression problem will lead us in 
endless checks of approvals against the endless levels of desires. 
However, if – in order to escape the problem of regression – we 
point to an external source of authority of a desire, this might be 
far more detrimental to autonomy. LOD approved by a source 
external to the agent’s self could hardly be viewed as representing 
                                                
41 I Thalberg, ‘Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action’ [1978] Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 211, 219-220. 
42 This critique is obviously linked to the far broader determinism-free will old 
debate. I believe this critique applies to all potential models of autonomy and not 
merely to Frankfurt’s and Dworkin’s. Actually, it questions the potential maximal 
level of personal freedom in general, namely it raises doubts on how free a person 
can be rather than on how autonomous a person can be under a specific model of 
autonomy.  
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the agent’s very own will. Apparently, the hierarchical model falls 
either into endless regression or else into external authority.  
 
But this does not necessarily mean the model of Frankfurt collapses. 
Logically, there are two paths for solving the regression problem. The 
first path would be to present a method for determining a cut-off point 
in the endless string of levels of desires by way of reason. The second 
path would be to fine-tune the hierarchical model in order to show 
why proper review of the HODs could be sufficient, namely, how the 
HODs could escape the regression problem by resting on a solid (and 
internal) source of authority.43  
 
A common case study for reviewing the models of personal autonomy 
is the case of consensual enslavement. The case of enslavement seems 
alarmingly relevant to the debate over the consensual recruitment of 
intelligence agents. The case of intelligence agents, as in the case of 
slaves, emphasizes an important distinction between two different 
points in time relevant to freedom of the will. The first is the one point 
shortly before making a choice. The second point in time is soon after, 
as the choice has been made. Both the voluntary agent and the 
consensual slave may be free upon assuming the task. But it seems that 
both the agent and the slave face a problem of freedom soon after 
making a choice.44  
 
Using the consensual slave, Dan-Cohen suggests an extreme thought 
experiment. If we respect the slave’s autonomy, we apparently need to 
respect his choice to be a slave. Since his scope of autonomy soon after 
                                                
43 Frankfurt attempted to answer the regression problem with a different approach 
than the one suggested above. According to Frankfurt, there is no need for higher 
level desires on top of HODs as long as the identification between HODs and LODs 
is ‘decisive’. In this manner, Frankfurt is taking the first approach I have referred to 
for solving the regression problem, namely by suggesting a method for cutting the 
endless string of desires higher than the HOD. It seems that Frankfurt’s first 
attempt to cut the regressed level of HODs is mainly by way of fiat rather than by 
way of reason. As mentioned, the route that this paper suggests is different, since I 
am offering an internal source of authority, namely dignity and self-respect. H 
Frankfurt, ‘Identification and Wholeheartedness’, in DF Schoem (ed), Responsibility, 
Character and Emotions  (Cambridge UP 1987) 27-45; Christman (n 30). 
44 Dan-Cohen (n 25), 154-157. The volunteer soldier seems to avoid the limitation of 
her freedom of the will soon after making her choice to be recruited. I further 
elaborate on this distinction between the two temporal phases of the choice when 
subsequently discussing the example of consensual enslavement. 
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making this choice is expected to be restricted, Dan-Cohen further 
imagines a consensual slave whose scope of autonomy is not derogated 
compared to his non-slave free counterpart, for example, due to his 
master’s ‘liberal’ approach and relatively flexible terms of slavery.45 
Since our moral intuition rejects such a situation regardless of this 
‘liberal’ approach, Dan-Cohen urges us to reach a conclusion on the 
limited importance of autonomy compared to other values, such as 
dignity. In contrast, I argue against the very idea of the consensual 
slave to start with. For obviously if one can point at an autonomous 
slave, one can theoretically point at an autonomous intelligence agent.  
 
I contend that the idea of Higher Order Desires reveals the emptiness 
of the idea of consensual enslavement. By allowing the slave to be 
‘autonomous’ within a ‘reasonable’ scope compared to a non-slave 
person, a virtual (and external) higher level of desires is being created.46 
While the slave is capable of setting his HODs and identifying them 
with his LODs (due to his master’s ‘liberal’ rules of slavery), he is still 
not autonomous. The power of the master is equivalent to the creation 
of a virtual third and higher level of desires higher than the slave’s 
HODs. The slave’s owner now controls the higher level of HODs. The 
slave’s owner externally sets the scope of the slave’s HODs and can 
minimize that scope to zero at any given time subject to her sole 
discretion.  
 
As opposed to Dan-Cohen’s view, I believe the slave under these 
conditions is not autonomous while another person exercises such a 
dramatic control over the slave’s HODs. In the hierarchical model’s 
terms, one can define it as a situation in which the slave’s HODs stem 
from a higher level of desires, which is both irreversible and located 
outside the boundaries of the slave. Therefore, the specific consensual 
slave is not autonomous. The problem of irreversibility is particularly 
relevant to handler-agent relations, which in many cases resemble 
                                                
45 In order to refrain from status issues, Dan-Cohen even further defines the slave as 
autonomous de-facto. This way, the oxymoronic status of autonomous slave is 
avoided. The slave is not autonomous de-jure, but arguably autonomous de-facto. M 
Dan-Cohen, ibid, 156-157. 
46  Obviously, the reference to this third level of desires as virtual is strictly 
illustrative. The model does not recognize any level of desires higher than the HOD. 
However, this virtual level acts as if there is a third level of desires and by that 
assists us in understanding in such a case how non-authentic are the HOD’s and 
realize that the HOD’s stem from an external source of authority.  
23  European Journal of Legal Studies  [Vol.7 No.1 
‘liberal ownership’. These relations seem friendly, pleasant and 
cooperative. And yet, the handler could revoke that condition at any 
time.47 In contrast, the agent – just like the consensual slave – cannot 
unilaterally bring the relations into an end. His handlers hold the 
incriminating information. They can always respond with ‘burning’ the 
agent and revealing his true position.  
 
Dan-Cohen does refer to this issue of irreversibility of the slavery 
status and the consequent fragile freedom granted by the owner, since 
this freedom is fully subject to the owner’s sole decision to revoke. 
Dan-Cohen suggests a hypothetic counter party to the consensual 
slave, enjoying a similar level of freedom, which due to some illness, 
could be abruptly and randomly revoked.48 Apparently, this non-slave 
autonomous person shows us that even under the condition of 
potential revocation of freedom, a person, and therefore also the 
consensual slave, is still deemed autonomous. I argue against viewing a 
common denominator to a slave with relative freedom and to the 
person who might, at any minute, loose some of his freedom due to 
some illness. As I mentioned, many intelligence agents resemble the 
‘autonomous slave’. They typically enjoy a high level of freedom while 
controlled. However, the handler remotely controls the scope of this 
apparent freedom.  
 
All formulas of autonomy, including the hierarchical model of 
Frankfurt, emphasize the psychological aspect of autonomy. Autonomy 
is very much related to a state of mind and the ability to transform it 
into preferences, desires and choices. The very awareness of the slave 
that his state of mind is constantly conditional upon a third party’s 
approval creates a new derogated state of mind and sense of freedom. 
This is all similarly relevant to a case in which the slave’s produced 
HODs and consequent LODs eventually match the master’s will after 
                                                
47 For a first hand account of the irreversibility problem in the HUMINT context, see 
M Klingberg and M Sfard, The Last Spy (Hebrew Edition, Maariv 2007), 224-225. Prof 
Klingberg was an epidemiologist and vice president of the top-secret biological 
defense institute in Israel. Klingberg was also a senior agent recruited by the KGB 
and operating within the top-secret institute. For around 30 years, he 
communicated to the Russian intelligence invaluable secret scientific information 
from Israel. In his book, he describes his helpless efforts to bring his handling into 
an end, understanding that his voluntary handling could turn at any minute into 
being coercion-based. 
48 Dan-Cohen (n 25), 156. 
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all. It is the slave’s awareness to the potential limitation that counts, 
not the actual influence it might (or might not) have over the content of 
the slave’s will.  
 
The influence of the virtual third and higher level of desires controlled 
by the master comes into effect in both a positive and negative manner. 
The negative manner is obvious: the HODs of the slave – or the 
intelligence agent in the case of this paper – can only be produced and 
implemented as long as the master – or the case officer – approves 
them and chooses not to interfere. But there is also a positive and 
active manner of interfering with the slave’s process of setting desires 
and identifying with them. The very fact that the slave is aware of the 
veto power of the master and her power to bring immediate cessation 
to his scope of freedom influences, by itself, the psychological process 
of a free person.  
 
The slave is also constantly aware of the irreversibility of his situation, 
of this dependence upon the master’s good will and ever-temporary 
scope of freedom he will never control. This sense of clear subjection 
is fed into the slave’s process of producing desires and identifying with 
them in a recursive manner. To use an illustrating case from another 
field, consider a journalist in a totalitarian country, notified by the 
totalitarian regime that his writing topics and expressed opinions are 
subject to the absolute censorship power of the army. And let us also 
suppose that for two years, the topics and opinions elected by the 
journalist did not justify censorship from the regime’s perspective, 
namely the censorship prerogative is in force yet remains unexploited. 
Could this totalitarian regime seriously claim that the journalist 
exercised the right of free speech? I believe that this journalist 
exercises free speech no more than Dan-Cohen’s illustrating 
autonomous slave exercises autonomy.  
 
The idea of the virtual creation of a third and superior level of HODs 
also assists in explaining the distinction I have suggested between a 
soldier volunteering into an elite unit and a recruited intelligence 
agent. As this is a special unit of volunteers, which encourages only 
those who really want to stay, in being able to quit and stop obeying 
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her commanders, the soldier is autonomous. 49  She is capable of 
identifying her HODs with her LODs. There is no higher level of 
desires subjecting her HODs. On the other hand, just as the 
‘consensual’ slave has a virtual third and higher level of desires 
controlled by his master, so has the intelligence agent. He is not 
autonomous since the very nature of the relations with the handler 
creates this irreversible third and virtual higher level of desires 
externally controlled by his handler. But why is it that the virtual third 
level of desires I present derogates and sometimes even nullifies 
autonomy? What is the difference between the consensual slave and 
the intelligence agent on one hand, and the sick person Dan-Cohen 
describes on the other hand? The answer, so I would like to argue, may 
be found in the proposed dignity-based approach to models of 
personal autonomy.  
 
 A DIGNITY BASED INTERPRETATION OF AUTONOMY VI.
 
It is a belief shared by leading scholars that the hierarchical model 
constitutes the right foundation for understanding the psychological 
process of free action based on freely set desires.50 However, its fine-
tuning towards a coherent model continues. Generally speaking, the 
authority problem with regards to the HOD reflects an apparent logical 
no-through road. If the source for authority of the HOD is internal – 
namely stemming from another psychological event happening within 
the boundaries of the agent – then we need another verification of that 
other psychological event being freely initiated. This is the essence of 
the regression problem, since every relevant internal source of 
authority must be endlessly authenticated against a higher-level source 
(or desire). On the other hand, if the source for authority of the HOD 
is external to the agent, then how can one determine such a process of 
endorsing a desire as autonomous? This is where the modern attempts 
to enhance the hierarchical model come into the picture.  
 
                                                
49 Again, in this example the assumption is that the elite unit is a unit of volunteers 
which even encourages candidates during training to quit so only those who really 
want do stay.  
50 See Taylor’s excellent summary on the current approaches to the hierarchical 
model and of its most recent and promising versions in his introduction to Personal 
Autonomy. JS Taylor (n 17), 1-29. 
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Both Frankfurt and other scholars made attempts to amend the model 
in order to meet its challenges. Dworkin argued that his demands for 
both procedural freedom and substantive freedom within his model 
avoid all three problems, including the problem of manipulation.51 
However, on top of failing to filter out cases such as the monk-agent, 
his requirement is too general, telling us to avoid wrong interventions 
in the autonomous desires-setting process, while it fails to tell us how 
to practically identify wrong interventions.52  
 
Frankfurt’s second attempt was to suggest a satisfaction-based analysis 
of identification. 53  This enhanced hierarchical model determines a 
person to be autonomous in reference to a desire, if that person 
accepts this desire as his own. The HOD under this approach is not 
normatively superior to the LOD. It is rather connected with a 
descriptive relation. The HOD, being descriptive and only describing 
the LOD as owned by the discussed person, apparently manages to 
avoid the problem of authority. By not being superior to the LOD and 
by not making a normative judgment on the LOD, we are no longer 
concerned with the level of authority they represent.54  
 
Frankfurt’s amended approach is still exposed to the manipulation 
problem.55 Apparently, the monk-agent will comply with Frankfurt’s 
requirement of satisfaction-based identification. Since the monk-agent 
is knowingly and willingly accepting the handler’s (abbot’s) will as his 
own, his HOD will identify with his LOD and describe them as his 
own. In such a case, we are left with a model confirming the monk-
agent as autonomous, while we intuitively disagree. 
  
Additional promising attempts to cure the inherent problems of the 
hierarchical model are related to Christman, Bratman and Kelstrom. 
                                                
51 In short, the demand for procedural freedom requires that manipulation and 
deception do not influence the identification process. G Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and 
Behavior Control’ (1976) 23 Hastings Center Report; Taylor (n 17), 4.  
52 G Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge UP 1988)); Taylor, (n 
17), 7-8.  
53 Frankfurt made two attempts of addressing the criticism on his model. The first 
suggested that a decisively made HOD could escape the problems of regression and 
authority.  
54 H Frankfurt, ‘Reply to Gary Watson’ in S Buss and L Overton (eds), Contours of 
Agency (MIT Press 2002), 160; Taylor (n 17), 9. 
55 Taylor, ibid, 11.  
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They all attempted to show that the HODs stem from an authoritative 
source over the LOD. Christman’s model requires non-resistance of 
the person to the development of the desire accompanied by minimal 
rationality and lack of influence on self-reflection. Apparently, his 
model is also prone to fail in the case of the monk-agent, since it 
cannot reject consensual and total subjection to the will of another 
person, which is not the result of direct interference.56  
 
Bratman’s and Ekstrom’s models both find a source for the authority of 
the HOD within the self of the person. Bratman’s model requires that 
the person decides to treat his desire as reason-giving while being 
compatible with the person’s other perceptions pertaining to what to 
treat as reason-giving.57 Ekstrom’s model finds a person autonomous 
on HODs that cohere with her other perceptions that constitute her 
core and true self.58 At first glance, both last models of Bratman and 
Ekstrom have the potential of escaping the major problems of the basic 
hierarchical model: regression, authority and manipulation.59 I believe 
resorting to the core self as a source of authority carries new types of 
risks. A new type of manipulation arises – manipulation and 
intervention in the constitution process of the self. Socioeconomic 
background, parenting approach, health condition and education are 
all examples of elements influencing the constitution of the core self 
and over which the person had limited control, if any at all.60 This 
point leads me to raise another objection to these two enhanced 
models; their over-subjective approach. 61  They both represent a 
subjective analysis of autonomy and are dependent upon the person 
adopting a certain approach to her desire in order to be autonomous. 
 
                                                
56 J Christman, ‘Defending Historical Autonomy: A reply to professor Mele’ (1993) 23 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 281; JS Taylor, ibid, 10.  
57  M Bratman, ‘Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason’ (1996) 24(2) 
Philosophical Topics 1, 9-11.  
58 LW Ekstrom, ‘A Coherence Theory of Autonomy’ (1993) 53(3) Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 599, 603-606.  
59  See Taylor’s excellent outline in Taylor (n 17) at 13. 
60 Both models could also face difficulties in cases of a sharp and revolutionary 
change in a person’s personality and structure of the self, while still no autonomy-
nullifying influence has been involved. 
61 It is worth noting that the two models are not purely subjective. They do allow us, 
for example, to determine a person as non-autonomous although the person himself 
believes he is exercising free will, as in the case of the monks.  
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Intuitively, I believe that autonomy is a notion with strong sociological 
roots. Society sets the limits of autonomy. It influences a person’s 
perception of her own autonomy and its limits. And yet, under these 
subjective models, social perceptions are not relevant in determining 
an autonomous decision or action.62 On the other hand, the subjective 
approach makes sense, since an external source of authority over the 
agent’s choice-making process seems to contradict the essence of 
autonomy.  Attempting to solve these problems is far beyond the 
reasonable scope of this paper. However, a new interpretation of the 
hierarchical account of autonomy – any coherent account – could be 
most helpful in understanding the true nature of common aspects of 
‘running’ an agent, like control, manipulation, servility and 
irreversibility. 
  
Arguably, the HOD of the person is expected to confirm the 
authenticity of the endorsement of the LOD of a person. In order to 
verify the authenticity of the HOD, most recently proposed 
hierarchical models of autonomy tried to verify that the endorsement 
process was either free of external intervention or that the agent 
verifies or reaffirms his ownership of the LOD. I am not certain that an 
external intervention is by itself an autonomy-nullifying element. Take 
for example people who give other persons, like friends or spouses, a 
dominant influential position in their lives. Is the less dominant friend 
really non-autonomous?63 
                                                
62 On the sociological aspects of the notion of autonomy, see: C Mackenzie and N 
Stoljar, ‘Introduction: Autonomy Refigured’, in C Mackenzie and N Stoljar (eds) 
Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Automony, Agency, and the Social Self 
(Oxford UP 2000), 3-31; J Christman, ‘Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism 
and the Social Constitution of Selves’ (2004) 117 Philosophical Studies 143.  This 
apparent social indifference of the models adds to their over rigidity. They seem to 
be blind to different views of autonomy that are influenced by changes of society, 
context, time and place And yet being anchored to the core self of the person, the 
models of Bratman and mainly Ekstrum’s, show sufficient flexibility in determining 
different levels of autonomy for different people in similar circumstances. 
63 This line of thought may seem similar to Raz’s theory concerning the service 
conception of authority. However, Raz’s argument deals mainly with the question of 
when is x’s authority over y legitimate, while this paper seeks an answer to a more 
fundamental question: is x exercising authority over y (or alternatively is y autonomous). 
Regardless of the different focus of the arguments, Raz deals – as a peripheral 
question – with the issue of identifying authority. For example, from his reference 
to this question it seems clear that the case of person x accepting person y’s 
judgment rather than exercising x’s own judgment isn’t a case of y’s authority over 
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Clearly, not every influence on desires setting is compromising 
autonomy, not even every causally critical influence. I further argue 
that not even any manipulation denies autonomous decision-making.64 
At the same time, I am not convinced that the verification of the lack of 
external influence should stem strictly from the discussed person’s self. 
The case of the monk-agent may suggest that some cultural institutions 
may have a relevant normative position on the matter. This is why I 
suggest the notion of humanity or dignity as the verification tool for 
determining unacceptable intervention in the endorsement and 
identification process. 
  
I suggest a similar route initially suggested by Frankfurt, only in the 
opposite direction. The original idea of Frankfurt in suggesting the 
hierarchical model was to sketch a unique concept of a person.65 The 
idea is that persons are unique in their way of exercising their free will. 
By accurately describing the way human will is autonomously 
exercised, we could end up with a clear concept of a person. This 
attempt has obviously been proven to be unsuccessful. Apparently, we 
face difficulties in drawing the complicated concept of a person out of 
the model of free action. I argue that the task should have been set in 
the opposite direction. 
  
As complicated as it may be, we do have a good understanding of the 
concept of a human and of humanity. We rarely argue the question of 
what are human beings. While this is difficult for us to define, we 
share social intuitions about what a human being is, and what 
humanity is. It is human autonomy, which we actually find difficult to 
define. But having a concept of humanity or dignity (as a representative 
notion of humanity) could assist us in making this definition. If 
autonomy is a unique human virtue, and if we recognize humanity or 
                                                                                                                                        
x, unless x permanently subjects his judgment to y’s superior judgment. J Raz, ‘The 
Problem of Authority: Revisiting the service conception’ (2006) 90 Minnesota L Rev 
1003, 1018. The main task of this paper is to tackle Dan-Cohen’s argument according 
to which (and in contrast to Raz), autonomous slavery is theoretically possible, for if 
autonomous slavery is indeed possible as Dan-Cohen contends, it is obvious that so 
is the case with autonomous handling.  
64  On the philosophical analysis of manipulation, showing different types of 
manipulation with apparently different moral outcomes, see: R Noggle, 
‘Manipulative Actions: A conceptual and moral analysis’ (1996) 33 American 
Philosophical Quarterly 43. 
65 Frankfurt (n 38), 6-7. 
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dignity, then an autonomous decision should be one taken without a 
dehumanizing interference. In this respect, I use dignity as a concept 
of humanity. 66  Therefore, I would like to offer a perception of 
autonomy that incorporates dignity-compromising influences on the 
choice-making process.  
 
This theoretical and moral approach will result in preventing occasions 
where one makes a choice under dignity-undermining conditions 
while still considered to be autonomous. The reason is that unless such 
an interpretation is adopted, a human being adopting a desire under a 
dehumanizing effect might be determined autonomous after all. If 
being autonomous is an exclusive human status, we might reach in 
such a case an impossible condition in which a creature is both 
dehumanized in relation to trait X (autonomy), yet holds an exclusively 
human status in relation to trait X. 
 
The hierarchical model seems the right mechanism to make this 
verification. As mentioned, this paper is absolutely not targeting the 
goal of suggesting a new model of personal autonomy. My proposal of 
the dignity-based review of autonomy could be incorporated, however, 
as an addition to most coherent models. Therefore, the account I 
suggest should be viewed as an interpretation relevant to most 
successful models rather than as an independent and comprehensive 
model by its own. 
 
I am suggesting that the hierarchical model of personal autonomy 
should be interpreted so a person A is autonomous in reference to a 
desire X if and only if: (1) A endorses desire X as his own (under the 
terms of a coherent model); and (2) if, at the time of endorsing desire X 
as his own, A was not under an influence pertaining to X (whether 
internal or external to A) which amounts to violating A’s dignity, and is 
related to fulfilling (1). 
 
This interpretation of the hierarchical model leads to a few conclusions 
relevant to both the understanding of the notion of autonomy in 
general and agents’ handling in particular. This interpretation suggests 
a new source for dealing with the regression and authority problems: 
                                                
66 While I elaborate on this issue in later stages, it is nevertheless important to note 
at this stage that I am aware that identifying dignity with humanity is not necessarily 
a common and non-controversial approach.  
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humanity. We may not need to resort to any higher level of desires 
since the dignity-based review is definite. The use of human dignity as 
a representing notion of humanity is a potential source of authority. 
Humanity is both an internal and an external source of authority for 
the desires-setting process of a person.67  
 
 DIGNITY AND SELF-RESPECT VII.
 
Using the term ‘person’ requires further clarification. One could argue 
that, as opposed to my suggestion, it is not at all clear what a ‘person’ 
means, in contrast to what ‘homo sapiens’ means. In the philosophical 
literature, not every biological human being is automatically deemed a 
moral person. Typically, some cognitive criteria must be met for a 
biological human being to be recognized by philosophers as a person 
in the moral sense.68 Others, like Peter Singer, are located at the other 
end of the debate on human uniqueness, arguing that there is no such 
uniqueness.69 There is an immediate link between this question and 
the question of what is respect or dignity. If only persons are legitimate 
claimants of dignity or self-respect, then one can hardly deal with 
defining the content of dignity unless simultaneously dealing with 
what makes a person. 
 
                                                
67 We may also avoid the debate on the relations between internal influences (like 
drug addiction) or external influence (like coercion). The notion of compromised 
dignity may contain the two sorts of threats to freedom of the will. Both the 
uncontrolled need for drugs and the subjection to external coercion seem to be 
derogating the influenced person’s dignity while making his choice. 
68 The Kantian list of human traits being the source of the moral uniqueness of 
human beings reveals a capacity-based approach to persons, like the human 
capacity for self-legislation. This however did not prevent Kant from reaching the 
ultimate conclusion that as a result every human being deserves intrinsic value for 
the very fact of being human, although we do know these moral and cognitive traits 
Kant refers to are differential in reference to different individuals. I Kant, 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (first published 1785, Yale UP 2002) 4:428, 
36; 4-434-35, 42-43. Korsgaard offers a non-gradable Kantian approach to human 
rational capacity irrespective of people’s actual differences in such capacities in CM 
Korsgaard, ‘Fellow Creatures: Kantian ethics and our duties to animals’ (2004) 25 
The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 81-82.  
69 As a result, Singer wishes to convince us that from the moral standpoint, humans 
and animals should be deemed equal. P Singer, ‘All Animals are Equal’ in T Regan 
and P Singer (eds), Animal rights and human obligations (USA, Pearson 1989), 148-162. 
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It follows from my argument that people recognize a person, namely 
the claimant of self-respect more easily than philosophers do. I am 
aware of the common perceptions of dignity and of self-respect, which 
do not necessarily overlap.70 I argue for a smaller gap between the two 
concepts, if any. I believe Margalit’s definition of one (dignity) being a 
behavioral expression of the other (self-respect) is a move in this 
direction.71 However, for the sake of clarity, my argument will refer to 
dignity as self-respect. Therefore, by referring to dignity-compromising 
effect, like Margalit, I mostly mean humiliation. 
 
This only opens the gate for many more questions. Who deserves self-
respect? Is self-respect gradable? How do we determine one’s 
humiliation? Do we cling to the humiliated person’s subjective 
response to humiliation, or is an objective standard involved? Clearly, 
these are very important questions worthy of a more thorough and 
separate attention than what could be reasonably included within the 
discussion over the autonomy of intelligence agents. I will mainly state 
my answers to these questions rather than suggest a full philosophical 
or legal argument to support them. Luckily, Margalit’s thorough 
account of self-respect offers many of the missing arguments in his 
Decent Society.72 
 
I agree with Margalit’s account of self-respect deeming every human 
being as worthy of self-respect, solely for the very reason of being 
human. Accordingly, I disagree with many philosophers who view 
certain cognitive demands as prior conditions for this moral status. I 
argue for the basic respect people deserve, whether professors or 
comatose, mentally ill, intelligent and educated adults or young 
children. It is indeed their basic and non-gradable right not to be 
humiliated. In agreement with Statman, I believe it takes a person with 
cognitive capacities to humiliate. However, as opposed to Statman, I 
see no further capacity required in order to be humiliated, other than 
simply belonging to the human species.73 
 
                                                
70 D Statman, ‘Humiliation, Dignity and Self-Respect’ (2000) 13(4) Philosophical 
Psychology 523, 523-526. Also see Statman’s reference to Feinberg’s claims-based 
approach to dignity versus respect in J Feinberg and J Narveson, ‘The nature and 
value of rights’, (1970) 4 The J of Value Inquiry 243, 252-253.  
71 A Margalit, The Decent Society (Harvard UP 1996), 51-53. 
72 ibid, 57-112. 
73 Statman (n 70), 524-526. 
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I argue for a combined subjective and objective approach to 
determining humiliation. It is essential to take account of the agent’s 
subjective sense of humiliation when such sense of humiliation affects 
his decision process. However, as the cases of the monk-agent and the 
servile woman suggest, an objective review of humiliation is of similar 
relevancy: 
 
The servile woman sees it as her duty to serve her husband, take care 
of his needs and advance his career, and the fulfillment of these tasks 
brings her great pleasure and satisfaction. According to the 
psychological – subjective concept of self-respect, her husband’s 
behavior and demands do not injure her self-respect; hence they are 
not humiliating. According to the moral – objective concept, however, 
the situation is humiliating, as it reflects an undermined sense of self-
respect by the servile woman.74 
 
Self-respect as a parameter in the hierarchical model of autonomy is 
therefore both a subjective and a social concept. The self-respect of 
person A is, in my opinion, both self-reflective as well as dependent 
upon social conventions of humanity. Person A can therefore be 
mocked and hence humiliated without necessarily feeling humiliated. 
It is sufficient that A’s surroundings deem it to be the case. In this 
sense, I follow Dan-Cohen’s concept of collectivizing the notion of 
dignity: 
 
Once an action-type has acquired a symbolic significance by virtue of 
the disrespect it typically displays, its tokens will possess that 
significance and communicate the same content even if the reason 
does not apply to them… As long as certain actions are generally 
considered to express disrespect, one cannot knowingly engage in 
them without offending against the target's dignity, no matter what 
one's motivations and intentions are.75  
 
The idea that self-respect reflects the equal right not to be humiliated 
leads to the conclusion that the concept of self-respect is not 
gradable.76  Therefore, there are no persons more self-respect worthy 
                                                
74 ibid, 527 
75 Dan-Cohen (n 25) at 162. 
76 Holding this position, I no doubt support the type of justification for self-respect 
to all humans embedded in the value we, humans, ascribe to the trait of being 
human while no other criteria is required. Margalit (n 71), 77 
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than others. This obviously does not mean that each individual is 
equally humiliated by the same humiliating act. The dignity violation 
review in the suggested interpretation of the hierarchical models 
applies to the environmental conditions apparently influencing the 
endorsement and identification process of the LODs by the HODs. 
Therefore, not every compromise to self-respect (namely humiliation) 
automatically means a risk to one’s autonomy, unless it affects the 
identification process with one’s desires. 
 
Another very important implication of the suggested approach to 
autonomy is the sort of link it creates between the notion of autonomy 
and the notion of dignity. As opposed to scholars who argue for 
independence of the two notions, under this formula the mutual 
relations seem more interdependent. 77  This is the major difference 
between Dan-Cohen’s approach and the one I suggest. While Dan-
Cohen manages to imagine a situation where a person could be 
severely deprived of his dignity while making his choice and yet remain 
autonomous, my interpretation to the hierarchical models suggests it is 
totally impossible. In contrast to my proposed interpretation of 
autonomy, Dan-Cohen could define the consensual slave, the servile 
woman and the monk-agent as autonomous, although humiliated while 
making their choices.78 
 
Addressing the irreversibility of the status of the slave and the 
reversibility of the rights granted by the ‘liberal’ owner, Dan-Cohen 
suggests a free counterpart to the ‘autonomous’ slave, who, due to 
some physiological disorder, might be deprived at any given time of his 
freedom of movement or choice. Dan-Cohen further asks us to imagine 
an owner of the slave who hardly ever changes her mind, and therefore 
is not likely to revoke the ‘liberal’ conditions of the slave. Dan-Cohen’s 
arguments are most relevant to recruited agents. Handling relations 
are, as argued, largely irreversible. These relations typically allow some 
‘freedom’ to the agent, however such scope of freedom is largely 
determined by the handler’s revocable discretion. 
 
                                                
77 For an approach arguing autonomy and dignity to be independent notions, see 
Dan-Cohen (n 25). 
78 To a certain extent, I believe it is this paper’s suggested interpretation of current 
models of autonomy that best promotes Dan-Cohen’s agenda of raising the value of 
dignity to the higher place it deserves in the moral analysis of law. 
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Dan-Cohen is right in arguing that it is the status of slavery that 
undermines the slave’s dignity, as opposed to the physiological 
condition of his free counterpart. And yet, I wish to convince that this 
severe derogation of any person’s dignity cannot leave him 
autonomous while such humiliation influences his choice-making 
process. Under my suggested interpretation, the slave is not 
autonomous in his acts and decisions, since the influence on him while 
making and identifying with his choices is dignity derogating. 
 
I strongly resist disassociating the humiliation from its effect on the 
slave or agent’s choice. We assume that the physiological defect of his 
counterpart does limit the scope of his potential choices and influence 
them. I argue, however, that it does not affect his autonomy since (to a 
certain level) we do not regard such limitation of choice as humiliating. 
This is why, in my opinion, most disabled people, although deprived of 
a wide range of potential objects of desires, are still autonomous.79 The 
dignity-based interpretation of the hierarchical model of autonomy 
allows us to draw a distinctive line between the disabled person and 
the slave (or agent). And this distinction is irrespective of the fact that 
in theory, they do enjoy same scope of practical freedom. 
 
The common deontological approach refers to a narrow 
conceptualization of autonomy, namely to the Kantian sense of 
autonomy as the human capacity for self-legislation, of setting rules of 
a universal value:  
 
…the dominant trend in the deontological branch of liberalism has 
been to focus on autonomy. For the most part, dignity, if mentioned at 
all, has been seen as a matter of deferring to people’s autonomy, and 
thus had no independent role to play.80 
                                                
79 I do recognize however that from a certain level of physical limitation, disability 
may turn a person into non-autonomous. I believe the dignity-based interpretation 
of the hierarchical model of autonomy deals well with identifying this transition. It 
is the crucial point from which disability derogates the person’s dignity which (in 
reference to his choice making procedure) turns him into a non-autonomous 
person.  
80  Dan-Cohen 25), 158. Dan-Cohen further refers to scholars challenging this 
approach: RG Wright, ‘Consenting Adults: The problem of enhancing human 
dignity non-coercively’ (1995) 75 Boston U L Rev 1397. As to mainstream 
deontological approaches viewing dignity in the Kantian sense of a reflection of the 
notion of autonomy, see: TE Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge UP 1991), 
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Dan-Cohen deviates from this common approach by suggesting that 
dignity is not a derivative of autonomy but rather an independent 
value. 81  The interpretation I suggest reflects deviation from both 
approaches. The conclusion from my suggested interpretation is that 
dignity is not different to autonomy, at least not in the simple sense. 
Another conclusion is that autonomy is a broader notion than the 
Kantian autonomy to which most deontologists refer. It is much 
broader than the power to self-legislate. It is a notion reflecting the 
humanity of a person as a human being and as a person qua member of 
human society. 
 
The suggested concept may also point out some of the limits of models 
of basic philosophical notions such as autonomy. These notions 
maintain recursive relations with social conventions. On the one hand, 
the notion of autonomy is a building block in the construction of social 
norms and social language. On the other hand, the outcome of this 
construction process is an important feedback and input in the 
construction of the notion of autonomy. As a result, autonomy’s 
defining models cannot be static and scientifically accurate. Autonomy 
can only be based on dynamic, context-based and flexible foundations 
such as dignity or self-respect. 
 
A point which needs to be discussed is obviously related to the 
definition of ‘dignity’ or, more accurately, what acts constitute 
humiliation and undermining of self-respect. It seems that if the 
interpretation of a model of autonomy now rests on an open concept, 
such as dignity, the new interpretation might not be helpful. Instead of 
asking, ‘what is autonomy’ we may be engaged in the question of ‘what 
is dignity’ or ‘what is humiliation’? I believe this is not the case. After 
all, the entire argument is based on the assumption that we do 
intuitively recognize humanity and humiliation.  
 
Humiliating a person, as concluded from the suggested concept and as 
suggested by Margalit, is treating a human being as nonhuman. We 
                                                                                                                                        
43; CM Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge UP 1996); AW Wood, 
Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge UP 1999). 
81 Dan-Cohen argues that his argument for dignity as an independent notion in 
relation to autonomy is actually Kant’s. According to Dan-Cohen, the mainstream of 
deontological readers of Kant misunderstand Kant’s description of dignity as 
respect to autonomy and hence setting dependence relations between dignity and 
autonomy. Dan-Cohen (n 25), 158-159. 
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identify such occasions, just as we intuitively and immediately identify 
a creature as a human being and a human as sad or laughing or in 
pain. If we do not recognize dehumanized humans, this means we 
cannot recognize humans as well:  
 
There are various ways of treating humans as nonhuman: (a) treating 
them as objects; (b) treating them as machines; (c) treating them as 
animals; (d) treating them as subhuman…82  
 
The apparently blurred boundaries of the notion of dignity are not 
necessarily related to vagueness but rather to dignity being a dynamic 
notion. Self-respect (or dignity) reflects both a social and a personal 
perception of humanity. It therefore changes with time, place and 
context. We should therefore view this notion as dynamic and flexible 
rather than opaque. As I commented earlier, a definition of a notion 
such as dignity could never be scientifically accurate. And neither 
should it be.  
 
Taking these insights back to the practical dilemmas concerning our 
group of voluntary agents, the questions remain: Have these apparently 
voluntary agents really made autonomous decisions? Can they ever be 
an autonomous party to a contract with a handler as the Supreme 
Court presumed? 
 
 AGENTS AND THE RESPECT-BASED APPROACH TO AUTONOMY  VIII.
 
The case of the false-flag recruitment seems relatively easy. A person 
driven into such an unreal environment is put into an unreasonable 
position. Just imagine what the agent will feel should the truth be 
revealed to him: he would feel angry, a loser, and a fool;  humiliated. 
He just found out he has served the devil. We would think the same – 
the critical influence on his preferences and desires setting while 
considering being an agent was humiliating. Such an agent is therefore 
not autonomous.  
 
The combined subjective and objective measurement of self-respect 
allows us to reach this conclusion regardless of the agent himself not 
                                                
82 Margalit (n 71), 89. 
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being aware of his humiliation upon making his choice.83 On a lower 
scale, similar conclusions may arise with regard to X, the agent that 
was convinced based on a fake polygraph check that the risk he was 
facing was reasonable. X identified with a desire to continue his activity 
in a process that was affected by a humiliating influence. He is 
anything but an autonomous agent.84 
 
Raviv’s case is a little more complicated. Does taking advantage of his 
personality disturbance constitute an influence on his preferences-
setting process amounting to humiliation? In my opinion the answer 
would probably be positive. However, Raviv’s criminal verdict gives us 
reason to believe Raviv himself does not feel the same.85 Raviv liked 
being an agent, and it is quite clear he does not view the influence on 
his choice as humiliating. This reveals a point of strength of the 
proposed interpretation to models of autonomy. Self-respect is a 
notion capable of absorbing both the agent’s attitude to her choice, 
alongside society’s attitude to the very same choice. 
 
The monk-agent or Raviv may find the level of influence over their 
desires-setting process reasonable. At the same time, an objective 
observer aware of the social perception of such a condition may have a 
different view. She may consider their condition to be humiliating to a 
critical level of influence over the agent’s choice making. This is why 
the proposed interpretation is manipulation resistant: In most modern 
societies, driving a challenged person into a dramatic and life-risking 
choice is considered to be a humiliating influence, irrespective of the 
formal prior consent of the recruit. This is why most of us won’t find 
Raviv to be an autonomous agent once we become aware of his 
personality challenges. 
                                                
83 As in the case of the seamless rape in the case of Minkowski, even if the agent is 
being handled under a false flag for his entire life, he is still humiliated while 
deciding to adopt the will to be handled and hence non-autonomous. This is a 
result of the objective element in defining humiliation. The reference to Minkowski 
is Dan-Cohen’s (n 25).  State v Minkowski, Cal. App. 2d 832; 23 Cal. Rptr., 92. 
84 The first two cases of agents, namely the cases of the manipulated agents are 
easily dealt with by the hierarchical model of personal autonomy. They’re clearly 
non-autonomous agents based on the model. In contra-distinction, the monk-agent 
and agents with a strong element of servility, are the cases where the model is error 
prone since the agent reaffirms the deprivation of his will as a genuine reflection of 
his very own will.   
85 State of Israel v Avishai Raviv (n 16). 
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The suggested interpretation also offers a new perspective on the 
monk-agent. As with Raviv’s case, the dignity-based review allows us to 
overrule the monk-agent’s personal perception by measuring it in 
relation to social concepts of humiliation. In most societies, substantial 
subjection of the will – regardless of it being genuinely consensual – is 
dehumanizing. It matches Margalit’s definition of humiliating 
practices, such as treating people as if objects or machines, regardless 
of their willingness to be used as such. The fact that a servile person A 
adopts desires X1 to Xn on a constant basis purely due to adopting 
somebody else’s will is putting A in a dehumanized condition while 
adopting his desires. He seems programmed and mechanical; not 
human and humiliated. 
 
The case of Ames reveals another dimension of the proposed 
interpretation to personal autonomy. As opposed to recruited agents 
like Kilngberg, Ames didn’t hold even an apparent moral justification 
for his activity. He personally approached the Soviets and offered his 
information and services for money. Other than pure greed, there 
seems to be no influence on Ames’ recruitment choice, let alone a 
humiliating one. 
 
What type of agent could be more autonomous in his choice to serve 
another state than Ames? He is a senior intelligence professional aware 
of all the methods and risks of the HUMINT relations. His skill made 
handling tricks, manipulation or tight control quite irrelevant. Due to 
his seniority, relations with his handlers should be quite balanced. 
Have we finally met an agent operating autonomously on his own will? 
Have we managed after all to describe a case of two autonomous 
parties who freely form a contract between a handler and an agent in 
accordance with the way the Supreme Court viewed handling 
relations? Not necessarily. 
 
Ames, like most recruited agents, was exposed to the influence of the 
irreversibility of his status once recruited. Like the ‘autonomous’ slave 
of Dan-Cohen, it seems that we should similarly consider Ames not to 
be an autonomous agent. 86  From what we know, Ames was 
                                                
86 While this point needs to be further analyzed in a different paper, it is my 
intuitive feeling that a dignity-based influence test, as proposed, may lead to a more 
balanced conclusion. In examining Ames’ dignity while under this influence to 
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autonomous in the first phase of electing to be an agent, partly because 
there was no evident humiliating influence on his desire to will to act 
as a Russian recruited agent. However, as the case of Markus Klingberg 
reveals, almost all agents, like the consensual slaves, face a problem of 
irreversibility. 
 
The only way out of the agent status is through the consent of the 
handlers, since they have the incriminating information and the ability 
to ‘burn’ the agent. No agent could be positive that the consent for 
cessation of his operations, even in a case where it is expressly given, is 
indeed genuine and will be respected. Applying pure cold rationality 
may lead the agent to adopt a more balanced approach to this problem 
of irreversibility, since the intelligence organization has many reasons 
to refrain from burning the agent.87 Having said that, the risk to the 
agent of an assessment error in this regard is, in most cases, too high.88 
 
As previously contended, the irreversibility problem of intelligence 
agents is analogous to the two temporal phases of consensual slavery. 
First is the deliberation and consent phase of accepting the 
enslavement. Second comes the phase following the consent, a phase 
during which the slave or the agent may consider cessation of the 
enslavement or handling relations. My interpretation of autonomy 
suggests that the agent is not autonomous during the second phase, 
even though he does not aspire to reverse his status or even expressly 
wishes to proceed as an agent.  
                                                                                                                                        
continue his services, I believe a dignity-based influence review may take into 
account his culpability and moral guilt.  
87 Applying pure logic, the agent should normally assume that his handlers would 
not punish his unilateral cessation of activity by way of exposing him. After all, such 
a move is not in the interest of the handlers and the intelligence organization they 
represent. His arrest might result with embarrassment to the handling organization. 
It might expose HUMINT methods and even serve as an intimidating experience 
that might be reducing the willingness of potential agents to be recruited in the 
future. However, stakes are too high. Taking the risk that his handlers might make 
an exception or find a sophisticated way of addressing these concerns is not 
necessarily smart. There is also the risk that the handling organization will take 
extreme moves to secure secrecy, including getting rid of the agent.  
88 For example, Marwan Ashraf's death raised many speculations, some of which 
connected his death to Israeli intelligence officers disclosing the fact that he served 
the Israelis as a recruited agent. U Bar-Joseph, ‘The Intelligence Chief who went 
Fishing in the Cold: How Maj. Gen.(res.) Eli Zeira Exposed the Identity of Israel’s 
Best Source Ever’ (2008) 23 Intelligence and National Security 226. 
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The very fact that the potential choice to reverse is being held by 
another person is a humiliating influence on the agent’s choice to 
proceed and therefore suggests he is non-autonomous. This condition 
is very similar to the virtual third level of desires that is created when a 
‘liberal’ master owns a slave. The scope of freedom of choice allowed 
de-facto does not erase the slave’s understanding that his practical 
freedom is at the mercy of his master.  
 
The case of Markus Klingberg illustrates in vivid terms the 
irreversibility problem.89 According to his version of the events, it takes 
him more than four years to gain the courage to confront his handler 
and announce that he wishes to quit. His handler does not use coercive 
language, but neither does he accept the announced cessation. 
Klingberg’s words allow us a rare view into the situation from the 
agent’s perspective:  
 
I quickly analyzed the situation. If I refuse, I’m taking the risk of 
bringing the situation to boiling temperature. They may give up. They 
may not insist. And maybe they won’t. Maybe they won’t give up...The 
presumption behind these relations was that they are voluntarily 
established and hence their strength. Not once, the question of “what 
if” crossed my mind. What if I wish to quit. That I could quit just the 
way I joined...Actually, it was the first time where for a second, I 
raised in my mind the option of the Russians moving to the level of 
extortion. But I immediately rejected it. It was obviously the worst 
alternative. At least this way, when we maintain voluntary relations, 
there’s respect and appreciation and the meetings could be conducted 
in good spirit. The move into a different level of relations will have 
enormous consequences. The voluntary relations leave some flexibility 
on my end...No. I decided I won’t refuse. That the relations with the 
Russians must not turn into coercion.90  
 
 CONCLUSION IX.
 
From to the proposed analysis, it follows that all recruited agents, from 
the ‘simple’ walk-ins like Ames to the complicated monk-agents, are 
not autonomous. Obviously, the immediate conclusion is that the 
Supreme Court’s classification of handling relations as contractual is 
                                                
89 On the case of Markus Klingberg, an Israeli defense scientist who was in fact a 
recruited Russian agent for around 30 years (n 47).  
90 Klingberg and Sfard (n 47), 224-25. 
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wrong. Even the most senior and professional recruited agents that 
voluntarily accept the recruitment seem to be inherently non-
autonomous. 
 
One possible explanation to what seems to be an inconsistent rule in 
Totten and Tenet cases may be that Court is in fact aware of the wrong 
conceptualization of the handling relations as contractual. Court may 
be aware of the inconsistency reflected by the view of a contract 
between non-autonomous parties. Determining such a handling 
‘contract’ to be unenforceable diminishes the effect of such wrong 
classification of the relations. By denying the binding promissory 
power from the handling ‘contract’ the Supreme court is in fact right, 
because due to lack of autonomous will, these relations cannot form a 
contract to start with. Whether out of mere legal intuition or a clear 
legal strategy, the Supreme Court sets a wrong rule and then cures the 
rule by forcing a contradicting legal result. By that, the Supreme Court 
is wrong and right about handling contracts and about personal 
autonomy. 
 
What could be the reason for this dual-head approach of the Supreme 
Court? This is obviously open for various possible explanations and 
should be the target of future research. I may outline briefly some of 
the potential explanations. First, this inconsistency could be another 
instance of the inherent problem of inconsistency in the law-espionage 
relations, which has been characterized in recent literature. 91 
Specifically, in this case, the view of a non-enforceable contract allows 
the law to portray a legitimate type of relations without pouring any 
legal substance into them. The contractual color aims at creating the 
impression of autonomous persons freely consenting to their valuable 
tasks. 
 
At the same time, determining such contract to be non-binding aims to 
avoid the discrepancy between this concept of autonomous handling 
and handling in reality. It allows the law to be simultaneously present 
and absent in the realm of espionage. Had the Supreme Court simply 
ruled that this realm is beyond judicial scrutiny, it could have been 
construed as placing a label of illegitimacy over this national activity. 
The dual-head approach of labeling the handling relations as 
                                                
91  R Bitton, ‘The Legitimacy of Spying Among Nations’ (forthcoming) (2014) 29 
American University Journal of International Law. 
43  European Journal of Legal Studies  [Vol.7 No.1 
contractual yet unenforceable allows the Court to refrain from 
developing a law of intelligence (had the contract been recognized as 
enforceable) and at the same time to avoid a questionable status of 
illegitimacy (had the court ruled that these relations exist in a legal 
vacuum).92 
 
This paper’s focus on handling contracts demonstrates a problem of 
inconsistency in the relations of law and espionage. From this analysis, 
it does not follow that law cannot or should not regulate espionage. To 
the contrary, just like regulating warfare, legal regulation of spying is 
extremely necessary. It does however show clearly, that as in the case 
of warfare, the regulation of handling relations cannot be based on the 
personal autonomy of the players. But if the parties to collection of 
intelligence from human sources are not autonomous and hence one 
cannot classify their relations as contractual, what legal groundwork 
correctly underpins them? 
 
Answering this question is left for further research. Intuitively, the 
answer seems to lie in the universal requirements of necessity and 
proportionality. According to this view, what removes objection to the 
handling of an agent is not his consent but rather the condition of 
necessity. The agent’s consent is still required, when relevant and 
possible. However, it is required in order to comply with the 
requirement of proportionality and not for recognizing the formation 
                                                
92 Theoretically, an autonomous agent is not totally impossible. This can be remotely 
possible if for some rare reason the agent assumes he is not subject to the 
irreversibility effect (for example, due to circumstances that ensure safe cessation) 
and if the handling of such an agent does not involve tight control, manipulation, 
subjection, servility or coercion. A contract among autonomous parties for handling 
relations is feasible in such rare cases. For example, the dignity-based test reveals 
autonomous agents on the far extreme point from Ames – ‘soldier-agents’. During 
World War II, the British intelligence recruited many agents from occupied 
European countries. Many of these agents had interests that completely overlapped 
those of their handlers. There had usually been no humiliating influence on their 
choice to become agents. Irreversibility was not an issue. Circumstances made all 
manipulation and agent running tricks unnecessary. Actually, as a result, their 
relations with their handlers resembled more the relations of elite soldiers with 
their commanders. RV Jones, Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939-45 
(London, Hodder & Stoughton 1979); RV Jones, ‘Intelligence Ethics’, in J Goldman 
(ed), Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence Professional (Scarecrow Press 2006), 
24-25. 
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of a contract. For handling a voluntary agent, although not an 
autonomous one, is ever less harmful than handling by coercion. 
 
Until requirements like necessity and proportionality constitute the 
basis for a new law of espionage, law and espionage will remain in the 
legal twilight zone. This undefined zone allows a confortable position 
to both spies and judges, away from the constraints of consistency. In 
the relations of law and espionage, where one can be voluntarily acting 
and not autonomous, where law can be at once present and absent, it 
is no wonder the Court can be both right and wrong. 
 
